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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE THE ERROR IN THE REASONABLE 
DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State mistakenly argues that Appellant invited the error 
pertaining to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Appellant's trial counsel 
articulated to the court "I accept eveiything" relating to the jury instructions. Brief of the 
Appellee at p. 9. 
The State fails to cite any authority indicating that invited error pertains to unsettled 
areas of law. In fact, People v. Hodges. 2005 WL 1645760 Tf 25, Colo.App.,2005, states that 
"...where an error or omission injury instructions is attributable to inadvertence or attorney 
incompetence and not to trial strategy, a reviewing court should review for plain error rather 
than viewing the contention as waived under the doctrine of invited error." 
Although it appears Utah appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue of 
invited error as it pertains to unsettled areas of law, federal caselaw provides guidance. The 
federal courts have expanded upon the concept of exceptional circumstances, as argued in 
Appellant's opening brief and utilized in Utah courts, to include a "plain error" concept at 
the stage of appeal. The United States Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. United 
States. 520 U.S. 461,117 S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that "...where the law 
at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is 
enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id. The United States 
Supreme Court agreed that the alternative would "...result in counsel's inevitably making a 
long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by 
existing precedent." Id., 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. United States v. Retos. 
analyzed this issue and explained that the question at issue here is not whether the error was 
plain at time of tried, but whether it is plain based on current law at the time of direct appeal. 
25 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir.l994)(emphasis added). In U.S. v. West Indies Transport. Inc.. the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the doctrine of invited error as it applies to jury 
instructions and found that "...where a defendant submits proposed jury instructions in 
reliance on current law, and on direct appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm, we 
will not apply the invited error doctrine." 127 F.3d 299 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
Appellant's counsel did not invite the alleged error in the instant matter because at the 
time of trial the reasonable doubt jury instruction on which Appellant's counsel was relying 
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was a settled area of law. See, State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). However, 
at the time of direct appeal the law for which the instruction had relied on was abandoned as 
unconstitutional. See, State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305. Therefore, because of the 
substantial change in the law from the time of the trial to the time of direct appeal, the change 
to the reasonable doubt jury instruction should be reviewed under either Utah's "exceptional 
circumstances" rubric or the "plain error" doctrine, as outlined in Johnson. Retos, and West 
Indies supra, and not the invited error doctrine. 
It is not possible for Appellant's counsel to invite the alleged error when counsel did 
not know that an error would exist. Writ of Certiorari was pending in the Reyes' case at the 
time of the trial in this matter and the outcome was unpredictable. This is particularly true 
given that two other cases, State v. Cruz 2005 UT 45, and State v. Weaver. 2005 UT 49, were 
argued the same day as Reyes before the Utah Supreme Court. Both Cruz and Weaver were 
arguing in favor of upholding Robertson, stating that they had been deprived of their rights 
by not having the word "obviate" used in their respective reasonable doubt jury instructions. 
Even those parties involved in Reyes may not have contemplated what that outcome would 
be given that the cases argued at the same time were taking opposing positions to Reyes1. 
The error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction was also inadvertent. See, e.g., 
Hodges. Appellant's trial counsel unintentionally agreed with the reasonable doubt jury 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court upheld Reyes in Cruz and Weaver's cases and 
determined that Cruz and Weaver's instructions had adequately conveyed the proper 
standard to the jury without the now abandoned phrase at issue herein. 
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instruction because she was unable to predict what the outcome of Reyes would be. It was 
not possible to object to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Reves was pending, 
See e.g. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. Therefore, trial counsel's failure to 
object at trial was inadvertent and should be reviewed under Johnson's "plain error" standard 
or Utah's exceptional circumstances rubric, as argued in Appellant's opening brief. 
Although Appellant's counsel did not object to the jury instruction at trial, there were 
exceptional circumstances that created a substantial likelihood that an injustice would result. 
Allowing the jury to deliberate based on the reasonable doubt instruction "eliminate all 
reasonable doubt" created the substantial likelihood that Appellant was found guilty based 
on a degree of proof that is lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required in 
criminal matters. See Reyes. As argued in Appellant's opening brief, allowing Appellant 
to be found guilty on a degree of proof that is lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
violated his due process rights and therefore, created a situation of substantial injustice, 
allowing exceptional circumstances to apply. As the Appellant's liberty is at stake and this 
issue is constitutional, the appellate court is "...obliged to consider it even though it was not 
raised in the trial court." State v. Jamesoa 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990). This unsettled 
interpretation of the law colored the ability of Appellant's trial counsel to raise the issue at 
trial, resulting an exceptional circumstance or Johnson's "plain error." 
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II. APPELLANT'S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE 
TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
In the State's Appellee's Brief, the State argues that Appellant's trial counsel was not 
ineffective based on her failure to move for a directed verdict after the denial of her motion 
to dismiss. Brief of Appellee p. 13. The State erroneously relies upon State v. Robertson. 
2005 UT APP 415, f 14 as support; however, Robertson only indicates that Robertson 
"moved to dismiss the charges or for a directed verdict," in the trial court. The Utah Court 
of Appeals did not render a determination, nor is this issue even before the court in 
Robertson. 
Under Utah law, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts have 
consistently followed the United States Supreme Court standard in Strickland v. Washington. 
466 U.S. 668,104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed 2d 674 (1984). Thus, the defendant is required to 
show first that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner 
and that said performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment; and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland at 
687; State v.Kelley, 1 P.3d 546 (Utah App. 2000), quoting Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 
521 (Utah 1994). 
Utah courts routinely consider motions to dismiss separate and distinct from motions 
for directed verdict. As its name implies, "a motion for a directed verdict under rule 50(a) 
contemplates only jury trials". See Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 711 P.2d 250,252 
(Utah 1985). In the context of a bench trial, the directed verdict's procedural counterpart is 
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a motion for involuntary dismissal under UT. R. Crv. P. 41(B). See Id., Bair v. Axiom 
Design. L.L.C.. 20 P.3d 388 (Utah, 2001). 
The Utah Supreme Court provides that a motion to dismiss is made at the close of the 
Statefs case and a motion for directed verdict is made at the close of all the evidence. State 
v. Adamson. 125 P.2d 429 (Utah 1942). UT. R. CRIM. P. 17(o), provides that "[a]t the 
conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the 
court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof, 
upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged 
therein or any lesser included offense." State v. Jackson. 857 P.2d 267, (Utah App.,1993). 
The standard for a directed verdict is that 'the court must decide whether the evidence 
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Wilkins v. Packerware Corp. Slip 
Copy, 2005 WL 1528670D.Kan., 2005. 
The timing of these motions is not the only characterization that distinguishes these 
motions from one another. Courts have imposed a separate standard for granting motions 
for directed verdicts than for motions to dismiss. When determining whether a motion for 
directed verdict should be granted, courts look to whether there is sufficient evidence to give 
the case to the jury. State v. Jackson. 857 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993). When considered a 
motion to dismiss, the courts consider whether the state has proven all of the necessary 
elements to make a prima facie case. State v. Milne. 124 P.2d 540 (Utah 1942). 
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In it's brief, the State argues that a motion to dismiss and a motion for directed verdict 
are "for all practical purposes identical." Appellee's Brief dX^. 13. However, Utah routinely 
holds motions to dismiss and motions for directed verdict as two separate and distinct 
motions. A motion for a directed verdict applies only to a jury trial, were a motion to dismiss 
applies only to a bench trial. Further, Utah Appellate Courts do not recognize these motions 
as identical or interchangeable. As this was a jury trial, Appellant's counsel was ineffective 
for arguing a motion to dismiss when she should have requested a motion for directed 
verdict. A motion to dismiss did not apply to this matter since it was a jury trial. The jury 
was the fact finder in this matter and not the judge, therefore a motion for directed verdict 
should have been made. Because counsel did not argue for a motion for directed verdict, 
Appellant was convicted of a crime of which he may have been acquitted. 
Appellant's trial counsel spent her entire motion arguing that the State failed to meet 
its burden because it did not establish defendant's intent, when she should have been arguing 
that the State failed to meet its burden because it did not sufficiently establish that the crimes 
committed were linked to defendant. Throughout the entire trial, the State was unable to 
establish through reliable witnesses that it was the defendant who committed these crimes. 
This deficient motion prejudiced Appellant by eliminating any opportunity for the court to 
enter its own judgment on whether the State had proven its case in light of the inconsistent 
and unreliable evidence the State produced at trial. The trial court acknowledged at the end 
of the State's case that a conviction was as "long of a shot" as the Judge had seen in a long 
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time. This demonstrates a likelihood that the court believed the State had not met its burden 
or that it was at least questionable whether the State had proved its case. Tr. 148. 
In a jury trial it is the judge who must determine if there is enough evidence to send 
the case to the jury if a motion for directed verdict is brought. In this matter, it appears that 
the court was questionable on if there was enough evidence to convict. Therefore, 
Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective because she did not move for a motion for directed 
verdict. If she had, it is possible that the court may not of found that there was enough 
evidence and dismissed the case because of the difference in the standard of the motions and 
the court's questionability of the evidence. 
The State argues that the denial of the motion to dismiss should have demonstrated 
that the State had sufficient evidence for a jury to convict. Although the trial court may have 
determined there was sufficient evidence to deny the motion to dismiss, it was not given the 
opportunity to hear a motion for directed verdict since Appellant's counsel did not move or 
argue the standard for one, and the trial court did not make a judgment as to the sufficiency 
of the evidence based upon the standard for a motion for directed verdict. Had the trial court 
been allowed to review the evidence under the standard of a motion for directed verdict, there 
is sufficient reason to believe it may have granted the motion and the charges against the 
Appellant may have been dismissed. 
Even if the trial court had determined that trial counsel's motion to dismiss could be 
construed to be the same as a motion for directed verdict, trial counsel's motion was deficient 
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in its content thereby denying defendant effective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel's 
motion and the court's response states in relevant part: 
COUNSEL: Well, I don't think that they have shown evidence as far as the 
intent or the purpose in any of these counts. First of all, on the burglary, that 
there was an intent before entering the residence. 
THE COURT: Well it says - the statute says "enters or remains." So if at any 
time, while inside, you have an intent to commit a theft, it's a burglary. 
COUNSEL: Okay. And then on the theft with the - with the purpose of 
depriving, there hasn't been any evidence shown that - that the vehicle was not 
just being temporarily borrowed, that - you know, that it wasn't being returned 
to the owner... Okay on the receiving stolen vehicle, there has to be the intent 
to procure the motor vehicle. I don't -1 don't think they've shown that, but 
well, I think they've - they have tried to put some evidence in on that. And 
then on the paraphernalia on the - they haven't shown any intent to use the 
paraphernalia. 
Tr. 141-142. This colloquy between Appellant's trial counsel and the court shows that 
Appellant's trial counsel did not attempt to argue that there was no reliable evidence 
whatever to show that the Appellant committed the crimes of which he was charged. 
Therefore, because she did not argue as to whether the evidence was sufficient to be sent to 
the jury or make a motion of directed verdict she rendered ineffective assistance to Appellant. 
Trial counsel's motion fell below the reasonable standards of professional judgment and said 
judgment prejudiced the defendant. 
In short, trial counsel deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel when she 
failed to move for directed verdict thereby depriving the court of determination under the 
correct standard. Trial counsel should have moved for a directed verdict based on the fact 
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that the State failed to prove that it had sufficient evidence to link the Appellant to the 
crimes, and should have made a motion for a directed verdict. In the event that this Court 
rules that trial counsel's motion to dismiss sufficed as a motion for directed verdict, trial 
counsel's motion and argument in support of the motion was so deficient that it deprived 
Appellant of effective assistance of counsel and sufficiently prejudiced the outcome of 
Appellant's case. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's Judgment, 
DATED this 14th day of November, 2005, 
Andrew Fitzgerald 
Attorney for Devon Kinne 
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that the State failed to prove that it had sufficient evidence to link the Appellant to the 
crimes, and should have made a motion for a directed verdict. In the event that this 
Court rules that trial counsel's motion to dismiss sufficed as a motion for directed verdict, 
trial counsel's motion and argument in support of the motion was so deficient that il 
deprived Appellant of effective assistance of counsel and sufficiently prejudiced the 
outcome of Appellant's case, 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's Judgment. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 2005. 
Andrew Fitzge^i 
Attorney for Devon Kinne 
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